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CHARLES BALL


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National Security Information

COVD-95-0278

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States Assessments Intelligence Brief

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
Denuclearizing Ukraine: Potential Bumps in the Trilateral Road (U)

Charles J. Ball
and
Mark A. Warmerdam

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LEE HARVEY W

92-347

March 1995



Abstract

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		CLASSIFICATION CANCELED	
		CLASSIFICATION RACKETED	
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Terms of the Trilateral Statement

~~The Russian Federation~~

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**Compensation for the U-235:
A Straight Exchange**

~~Ukraine~~

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¹ Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of U.S., Russia, and Ukraine, January 1994, U.S. Department of State Dispatch Supplement, Vol. 5, No. 1. (U)

² Russian-Ukrainian Accord Implementing Trilateral Nuclear Agreement, State Cable 141047Z February 1994, American Embassy, Moscow. (S)

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Ukraine's Energy Problems

**The Trilateral Offers Limited Help
For Ukraine's Reactor Needs**

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3 Implementation of the Trilateral
Statement: Ukraine

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Geopolitical Factors

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
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**Ukraine's Energy Dependence
on Russia: Opportunity for
Coercion**

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Russian Assertiveness Toward the
CIS

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⁹ *Status of Debt/Gas Supply Talks with Ashgabat and Moscow, State Cable 181517Z January 1995, American Embassy, Kiev. (C)*

¹⁰ *Deputy Minister Deems Russian Stand on Fleet 'Annexation', Kiev Intelnews, December 27, 1994. (U)*

¹¹ *Vladimir Socor, Military Bloc Foreseen, RFE/RL Daily Report, November 20, 1994. (U)*

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12 Vladimir Socor, *Joint Borders, Troop Deployments*, RFE/RL Daily Report, November 20, 1994. (U)

13 This pressure could be interpreted as violating the terms of the Trilateral Accord. (U)

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¹⁴ Groznyi—Ukrainian Reaction, State Cable 281557Z December 1994, American Embassy, Kiev. (C)

¹⁵ Were Crimea to erupt, Russia could be drawn into a violent conflict which would almost certainly produce a negative effect on Trilateral implementation. (U)

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
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