

BLACKOUT WARFARE

**What U.S. Leaders Must Do to Deter a Catastrophic
Sino-Russian Cyber/EMP/Nuclear Attack and Ensure
America's National Survival**



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KEY JUDGMENTS

For the past three decades the U.S. has pursued a provocative foreign policy of inserting U.S. military forces along Russia's and China's borders causing them to ally against us. Despite the increasing risk of a two-front war waged by Russia in Eastern Europe and China in Taiwan and the South China Sea, U.S. military leaders have testified to Congress that the U.S. currently has no contingency plans for how to defeat two nuclear superpowers fighting together against us.

Meanwhile, U.S. leaders have pursued a reckless policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament, failed to build a comprehensive national missile defense system and failed to harden America's national electric power grid from the existential threat of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack.

The use of super-EMP and cyber weapons at the onset of any conflict with Russia and China could shut down America's electrical power grid, critical infrastructure, food and water distribution system, internet, communications, emergency services and military early-warning satellites while blinding us against subsequent attacks. The U.S. nuclear Command, Control and Communications (C3) system might also be vulnerable to cyberattack, potentially disrupting the President's ability to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike.

The increasing nuclear imbalance between the U.S. and the Sino-Russian alliance, stemming from Russia's and China's massive nuclear buildup, has put the credibility of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in question, making the threat of nuclear aggression on the U.S. greater than ever before.

Due to U.S. failure to rebuild, let alone modernize, America's aging nuclear arsenal in response, the Sino-Russian alliance is on track to attaining nuclear supremacy over the U.S. within the next one to three years. This could enable America's nuclear superpower enemies to attack U.S. allies, blackmail or coerce U.S. leaders to do their bidding or even to engage in a catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland with comparatively little fear of an effective U.S. military response.

Despite these disturbing developments, the vast majority of U.S. policymakers remain largely oblivious to the increasing risk of a Sino-Russian cyber/EMP/nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland, mistakenly believing that the U.S. remains the strongest military power on Earth. U.S. leaders have done virtually nothing to protect U.S. citizens against these existential threats and so long as they do not take the increasing chance of a rapid U.S. defeat seriously, they are unlikely to take the difficult steps needed to prevent such a defeat.

America must adopt a new, more realistic national security strategy of retrenchment, which recognizes their spheres of influence, and significantly reduces our security commitments abroad in order to greatly diminish the increasing risk of stumbling into a full-scale war with the Sino-Russian alliance, while potentially serving to help divide and disrupt their alliance against us.

Immediate action needs to be taken by both the President and the U.S. Congress in order to double the size of America's strategic nuclear arsenal, deploy 5,000 ABM's and harden the U.S. electrical power grid against EMP attack in order to restore the U.S. ability to deter a catastrophic attack by Russia and China that, according to the Congressional EMP Commission, could result in the deaths of ninety percent of U.S. citizens within a year.

The Increasing Threat of a Cataclysmic Sino-Russian Attack on the U.S. Homeland

America has experienced a nearly unbroken string of catastrophic intelligence failures dating from the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor eighty years ago followed by the North Korean invasion of South Korea and Chinese intervention in the Korean War a decade later. More recently, U.S. intelligence failed to predict or warn U.S. policymakers about the Al Qaeda attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon which occurred twenty years ago this month or the recent outbreak of the deadly global COVID-19 pandemic, which has taken the lives of nearly 700,000 Americans thus far, more than died in every war the U.S. has ever fought, excluding the Civil War, and millions more people around the world to date. ¹Accordingly, the likelihood that U.S. intelligence will fail to predict let alone provide advance warning of an existential cyber/EMP/nuclear attack by America's nuclear-armed adversaries upon the U.S. homeland remains unacceptably high. The purpose of this article is to outline the unparalleled threat America now faces and provide a number of strategic recommendations to U.S. policymakers as to what measures can be done to mitigate these threats and ensure America's national survival.

Since the end of the Cold War three decades ago, America has 'slept', with its leaders either unaware or unconcerned about the increasingly bellicose and militarily superior 'New Axis' Powers aligning against it. This alliance by America's two most powerful adversaries is not a recent development. It was in July 2001, that the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (PRC) joined together to form the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Russian President Vladimir Putin has since described as "a reborn Second Warsaw Pact". ² They now lead a military alliance which includes over 68% of the landmass of the Eurasian super continent, nearly 42% of the world's population, nearly 30% of the world's GDP, and approximately 75% of the world's operational nuclear weapons, with over two-thirds of them deployed by Russia alone. ³

Over two decades ago, Russia developed super-Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons—nuclear weapons specially designed to greatly enhance their EMP effects--and subsequently shared this deadly technology with its Chinese and North Korea allies. More recently, Russia, China and North Korea have been assessed as likely having the capability to use super-EMP and cyberwarfare attacks to shut down America's electrical power grid, other critical infrastructure, internet, financial system, transportation system, food and water distribution system, communications system and emergency services in a matter of minutes. ⁴ Such attacks could very possibly disable U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and military early warning satellites, potentially blinding us to subsequent attacks against the U.S. and its allies. ⁵ U.S. military leaders have even expressed concern that our nuclear Command, Control and Communications (C3) system might be vulnerable to cyberattack potentially disrupting the President's ability to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike. ⁶ It could also serve to cut off our military forces from being able to communicate with their commanders or coordinate their attacks, making them much easier to defeat. The U.S. has yet to develop any super-EMP weapons to help deter the use of such powerful weapons against us.

¹ Joey Kennedy, "Who gets offended by the truth?" www.alreporter.com (19 Sept 2021)

² Douglas E. Schoen and Melik Kaylan, *The Russia-China Axis—the New Cold War and America's Crisis of Leadership.* (9 September 2014)

³ Rick Rowden, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the Biggest Organization You've Never Heard of." speri.dept.shef.ac.uk (3 September 2017)

⁴ Jamie Crawford, "The U.S. Government Thinks China Could Take Down the Power Grid." www.cnn.com 21 November 2014

⁵ Zak Doffman, "U.S. Military Satellites Likely Cyberattacked by China or Russia or Both." www.forbes.com, (5 July 2019)

⁶ Andrew Futter, "The Dangers of Using Cyberattacks to Counter Nuclear Threats" www.armscontrol.org (July-Aug 2016)

President Joe Biden was elected, in part, on a platform of protecting the environment from global climate change. However, many do not realize that the threat of a super-EMP/cyberattack on the U.S. homeland would likely be far more catastrophic for U.S. citizens, as well as for the environment, due to several reasons such as the fact that it would cause all 94 U.S. nuclear reactors to meltdown, spreading radioactive contamination and fallout to nearby U.S. cities. If such a nationwide EMP/cyberattack were to occur, it is quite possible that U.S. leaders might not be certain which country attacked us or who to retaliate against. In 2008, the Congressional EMP Commission estimated that such a cataclysmic attack on a national scale could cause up to ninety percent of Americans to die within twelve months due to starvation, disease and societal breakdown.⁷ A comprehensive cyberattack on the U.S. homeland could also kill tens of millions of Americans for the same reason. Given their destructive potential, U.S. national security professionals should seriously consider re-classifying cyber and EMP weapons as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Despite this fact, U.S. leaders have done virtually nothing to protect the American people from EMP and cyberattack just as they have failed to deploy a national missile defense system to protect us from nuclear missile attack. In the event of a catastrophic Sino-Russian attack against the U.S. homeland, there is a good chance that none of its allies would come to our defense out of fear that if they were to do so they might share our fate.

How did U.S. leaders allow America to become so vulnerable? Immediately following the end of the Cold War in 1991 under the unbelievably naive assumption that the existential threat of Russian nuclear attack had disappeared virtually overnight, U.S. leaders engaged in a reckless policy of rapid unilateral nuclear disarmament at a pace far exceeding Russia's, exposing the U.S. to unnecessary and increasingly intolerable risks. By 2016, the U.S. nuclear arsenal had been reduced from 30,000 nuclear weapons to a much smaller force of only 1,750 operational warheads deployed on aging delivery systems of increasingly questionable reliability, some of which are over half a century old. Today, only 720 of our warheads are ready to launch at any given time, of which fifty percent would likely survive a full-scale nuclear first strike.⁸ The reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile is also a major concern due to a failure of successive U.S. administrations to ensure they will function as designed in the event of a crisis.

Over the past decade, the U.S. has allowed itself to be overtaken/overmatched by the Sino-Russian alliance in virtually every recognized measure of strategic military power including offensive nuclear weapon systems, national missile defenses, hypersonic weapons, super-EMP weapons and cyberwarfare capabilities. The U.S. has also fallen behind its nuclear superpower adversaries in terms of their combined economic and industrial manufacturing might, their ability to produce major weapon systems without foreign components, critical infrastructure hardening against EMP/cyberattack, civil defenses and overall nuclear war survivability.⁹

In 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that the Russian Federation is in the process of building up its own nuclear arsenal to total 8,000 deployed warheads, which is over four and a half times more operational nuclear warheads than the U.S. possesses.¹⁰ Russia has also deployed six strategic nuclear 'superweapon' systems of a type the U.S. does not even possess that are not limited by any

⁷ James Woolsey and Peter Pry, "The Growing Threat from an EMP Attack" www.wallstreetjournal.com (12 August 2014)

⁸ Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "United States Nuclear Forces, 2020." www.tandfonline.com (13 January 2020)

⁹ Jamie Seidel, "China and Russia Have Formed Axis of Power, NATO's Top General Warns." www.news.com.au (6 February 2021)

¹⁰ Mark Schneider, "The Terrifying Way Russia Would Start a Nuclear War," www.19fortyfive.com (29 April 2021)

existing arms control treaty.¹¹ Rebekah Koffler, a former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) intelligence officer and the author of the new book, “Putin’s Playbook: Russia’s Secret Plan to Defeat America” has stated Russian President Vladimir Putin believes war with the U.S. is “unavoidable.”¹² She writes that:

Moscow is prepared to fight a nuclear war over its perceived sphere of influence, on which Russia has relied for centuries as its strategic security perimeter...The Kremlin envisions fighting a limited nuclear war with Washington, over contested areas such as Ukraine and Crimea, the latter of which Russia illegally annexed in 2014...Moscow also has conducted mock nuclear attacks on the U.S. homeland. The Russians regularly practice nuclear launches in simulation exercises, with Putin “pressing the button...There is no question that Russia is preparing for a nuclear conflict with the United States and NATO. The only question is whether this conflict can be deterred or fought.”¹³

U.S. satellite imagery has revealed that the PRC is the process of expanding their strategic nuclear arsenal at an extremely rapid pace by up to 4,000 warheads--a number of nuclear warheads 1,500-2,000% greater than recent U.S. Department of Defense estimates of the size of their entire nuclear arsenal.¹⁴ In his recent article, “Entangled America—Why Another International Nuclear Arms Race Has Begun”, Peter Huessy, Director of Strategic Deterrent Studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, reported that

U.S. satellites have discovered some 350-400 new Chinese missile silos, each laid out in a grid pattern some three kilometers apart. These new intercontinental ballistic-missile “launchers” are designed to hold the DF-41 missile. The DF-41 is a ten-warhead missile. Added up, the Chinese potential sprint to nuclear superiority may indeed be materializing, a possible four-thousand warhead build that would be 266 percent of the total deployed warheads currently in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. More worrisome, China’s future nuclear force could be 400 percent of today’s U.S. alert nuclear forces...Alongside China, America’s two nuclear-armed enemies would have combined strategic nuclear warheads some 600 percent greater than the United States. If compared by the number of nuclear weapons that are on alert on a day-to-day basis, the imbalance reaches on the order of 1,000 percent.”¹⁵

Mr. Huessy estimates that Russia and China could field a combined force of 9,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads within the next few years, of which he estimates 7,200 of which will be on alert and ready to fire at any given time.¹⁶ He stated that China could complete construction of its 400 DF-41 ICBM silos in as little as two years from the time their construction began based upon the time it took for the U.S. to build its own ICBM silos during the Cold War.¹⁷ However, given the rapid pace of their construction, it’s possible they could finish them even sooner.

¹¹ Mark B. Schneider, “Putin’s Nuclear Superweapons.” www.realcleardefense.com (7 May 2018)

¹² Rebekah Koffler, “Putin’s Flying Nuclear Command Center Presents a Domsday Scenario” www.thehill.com (4 Aug 2021)

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Bill Gertz, “Exclusive: Chinese Building Third Missile Field for Hundreds of New ICBM’s”, www.washingtontimes.com (12 Aug 2021)

¹⁵ Peter Huessy, “Entangled America—Why Another International Nuclear Arms Race Has Begun”, www.nationalinterest.org 22 August 2021

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

On August 12, 2021, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command Admiral Charles Richard stated, “We are witnessing a strategic breakout by China...The explosive growth in their nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I described as breathtaking...Frankly, that word ‘brehtaking’ may not be enough.”¹⁸ Admiral Richard characterized China as a “peer” nuclear competitor and noted that we now face two nuclear “peer” competitors, Russia and China, compared to one during the Cold War.¹⁹ General Hyten, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed Admiral Richard’s assessment stating:

It is going to take us 10 to 15 years to modernize 400 silos that already exist. And China is basically building almost that many overnight. So the speed of difference in that threat is what really concerns me most...Why are they building that enormous, enormous nuclear capability faster than anybody in the world?...It’s the almost unprecedented nuclear modernization...They could put, you know, ten reentry vehicles on every one of those ICBMs if they wanted to; There’s nothing to limit that ability.²⁰

Despite this increasing Sino-Russian nuclear superiority, the U.S. government currently has no plans to increase the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal at all, let alone restore ‘rough nuclear parity’ with Russia and China along with our ability to credibly deter a nuclear/cyber/EMP attack on the U.S. homeland. Disturbingly, not a single U.S. elected leader has advocated that the U.S. rebuild its aging and increasingly undersized strategic nuclear arsenal to meet the rising nuclear threat from America’s adversaries. As a result of the growing disparity between Sino-Russian unconventional warfare capabilities and those of the U.S., the chances of an unconventional nuclear/EMP/cyberattack on the U.S. homeland have, arguably, never been greater in U.S history.

Regarding the achievement of nuclear superiority, John J. Mearsheimer, a renowned foreign policy theorist who serves as co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, in his book “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” writes:

In the unlikely event that one state gained nuclear superiority over all of its rivals, it would be so powerful that it would be the only great power in the system. The balance of conventional forces would be largely irrelevant if a nuclear hegemon were to emerge.²¹

The combined nuclear arsenal of Russia and China is currently estimated to constitute nearly twice as many deployed strategic nuclear warheads as the U.S. but if they achieved anywhere near the 600 percent greater level that Peter Huessy predicts, then based on Dr. Mearsheimer’s statement above, they would be the only remaining nuclear hegemon left on Earth and the relative size of America’s conventional military would make no difference when it comes to deterring their aggression.

The more that Russia’s and China’s superiority over the U.S. in terms of nuclear and other unconventional weapons such as super-Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and cyber weapons as well as in terms of overall nuclear war survivability continues to increase, the greater their temptation will be to engage in increasingly brazen international aggressions abroad. We have already seen examples of this happening with Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine in 2014, China’s occupation of disputed islands in the

¹⁸ Mark B. Schneider, “The Chinese Nuclear Breakout and the Biden Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, www.realcleardefense.com (28 August 2021)

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Colin Clark, “US Momentum Grows for Push to Start Strategic Talks with China”, Breaking Defense” www.breakingdefense.com (13 Sept 2021)

²¹ Mearsheimer, John J., “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, pp. 5

South China Sea over the last several years and what appears to be an increasingly imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

The Intensifying Risk of Defeat in a ‘Two-Front’ War with Russia and China

In March-April 2021, Russia reportedly massed 100,000-150,000 troops along Ukraine’s northern and eastern borders poised for a possible invasion. In response, the U.S. raised its alert status to Defense Condition (DEFCON) Three for the first time since September 11, 2001 while U.S. European Command raised its watch level to “potential imminent crisis” in the fear that a Russian invasion of Ukraine might be followed by a Russian attempt to overrun frontline NATO states including the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.²² It was this crisis which caused President Biden to propose the June 2021 Geneva summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the full range of issues between the U.S. and Russia in an attempt to reduce tensions and improve U.S.-Russian relations which were then at their worst since the end of the Cold War. More disturbingly, their achievement of nuclear supremacy over the U.S. could potentially enable them to coerce or blackmail U.S. leaders to do their bidding and unilaterally disarm or, far worse, launch a catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland with a comparatively low risk of effective U.S. military retaliation. Such an attack would essentially have the effect of erasing the United States from the geopolitical map of the world much as the Allies did to Germany at the end of World War Two.

U.S. concerns about the risks of fighting a coming war with Russia and China are well-grounded, given it is unprepared to fight even a purely conventional war with them. In 2019, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, and David Ochmanek, one of the Defense Department’s key defense planners, offered a public summary of the results from a series of classified recent war games. Ochmanek’s summarized the results of the wargames by stating: “When we fight Russia and China, ‘blue’ [the United States] gets its [butt] handed to it.” As *The New York Times* summarized, “In 18 of the last 18 Pentagon war games involving China in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. lost.”²³ While many U.S. leaders have been keen to defend every nation threatened by Russian and Chinese aggression including those several thousands of miles away on their borders such as Taiwan and Ukraine where our enemies enjoy overwhelming theater military superiority, they need to adopt a more realistic assessment of the chances of the U.S. prevailing in such a conflict. In his article “Defeat is Possible”, Edward Geist, a policy researcher at the RAND corporation notes that in November 2018, the National Defense Strategy Commission found that “If the United States had to fight Russia in a Baltic contingency or China in a war over Taiwan ... Americans could face a decisive military defeat ... Put bluntly, the U.S. military could lose the next state-versus-state war it fights.”²⁴

*These findings suggest that, in a pitched battle with a near-peer adversary such as China, American forces may be defeated even if its commanders don’t make any mistakes...If defeat is to be prevented, U.S. strategy and planning may need to think about all the different forms defeat might take so as to be ready for alternative kinds of conflicts and concepts of operations...In the present, when near-peer adversaries are increasingly capable of defeating U.S. conventional forces on a theater level, U.S. decision-makers can no longer afford to pretend that defeat is not a real possibility. **And, so long as policymakers do not take losing seriously, they are unlikely to take the difficult steps needed to prevent such a defeat**...Unfortunately, U.S. strategy has not planned seriously for protracted near-peer conflict since the early Cold War...It is much more unpleasant to envision losing than winning — but this does nothing to change the fact that defeat is an increasingly plausible possibility in a war with Russia or China...An essential first*

²² Peter Pry, “Do We Have Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in our Future?”, www.thehill.com (6 August 2021)

²³ Nicholas Kristof, “This is How a War With China Could Begin” www.nytimes.com 4 Sept 2019

²⁴ Edward Geist, “Defeat is Possible” www.warontherocks.com 17 June 2021

*step could be to start taking the prospect of protracted near-peer conflict seriously. Whether or not U.S. policymakers want such a conflict, one may be imposed upon them — and at present, America is woefully underprepared for it.*²⁵

While U.S. policymakers are right to focus in recent years on the threat of great power wars with Russia and China, it is imperative that U.S. leaders recognize the increasing prospects of defeat in such conflicts so that they can better determine whether fighting losing wars against America's nuclear superpower enemies and risking the lives of tens of millions of Americans and our nation's very existence best serves U.S. national security interests. Furthermore, U.S. policymakers made a strategic mistake in expanding NATO into eastern Europe in the late 1990's and subsequently into the former Soviet republic of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as the U.S. and its allies do not have sufficient military capability to defend its Eastern European members against potential Russian aggression. In his article entitled "Going it Alone: European Security after Trump," Stephen Philip Kramer, a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars expounds upon NATO's inability to credibly defend its frontline NATO members from Russian aggression:

"Putin has allied Russia to China, defying the basic rules of geopolitics. But Russia and Putin—including his supporters—cannot be ignored; Russia remains a threat because of its vast...nuclear arsenal and its newly acquired skills at projecting its limited power in clever and unpredictable ways. It is also important to recognize that if Putin's regime feels seriously threatened, that there are few limits to what it might do to retain²⁶power...Almost every assessment of NATO's ability to deploy and defend against a major Russian incursion into the Baltics comes to the stark conclusion that our current capabilities are not adequate; the alliance would be presented with a fait accompli before it could emplace traditional defensive forces to meet the obligations of Article V of the NATO charter...It is easy to answer the question of whether Europe can defend itself against a determined Russian invasion of the Baltics or other NATO allies in eastern Europe—the answer is no. As noted above, geography and the current correlation of military power favor a successful attack. The cost of mounting a counterattack to reclaim and secure the territory would be tremendous for all concerned—and catastrophic for the nations and people in the areas where kinetic warfare would actually occur. Beyond that, the destruction of infrastructure and other enabling capabilities—obvious targets in such a war—would have massive impacts on both sides. This is all without including the possibility of nuclear escalation. Even the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons would have devastating consequences."

Eastern Europe was not considered a vital national security interest of the United States during World War II, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister ceded it to the Soviets at Yalta or during the Cold War when U.S. leaders refused opportunities to intervene militarily to defend Hungary and Czechoslovakia from Soviet invasion, nor is it today. Therefore, the U.S. should apply a cost-benefit analysis to consider whether the risks, in terms of a potentially catastrophic war with Russia, of maintaining its security commitments to the nations of Eastern Europe outweigh the benefits.

Meanwhile in July 2021, an official Chinese Communist Party video channel with close ties to the People's Liberation Army posted a propaganda video in which it threatened:

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Stephen Philip Kramer, "Going it Alone-European Security After Trump" www.nationalinterest.com (22 Aug 2021)

*When we liberate Taiwan, if Japan dares to intervene by force, even if it deploys only one soldier, one plane and one ship ...we will use nuclear bombs first. We will use nuclear bombs continuously until Japan declares unconditional surrender for the second time... We'll join forces with Russia and North Korea. Three arrows (countries) shoot together to hit the Japanese mainland thoroughly and in full depth.*²⁷

This Chinese government threat against Japan may have also been issued as a not-so-subtle warning to U.S. leaders as China would likely respond much the same way in a coordinated attack against the U.S. homeland with their Russian and North Korean allies if U.S. leaders dared threaten to intervene militarily in a war between itself and Taiwan.²⁸

Disturbingly, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, testified to Congress in April 2021 that the U.S. might well face a two-front or even a three-front war if Russia were to invade Ukraine and/or other Eastern Europe nations, China attacked Taiwan and North Korea were to attack South Korea at about the same time in coordination with one another.²⁹ Admiral Richard testified that the U.S. currently has no contingency plans for how to confront, let alone defeat, two allied nuclear superpowers in a future war.³⁰ Accordingly, the ability of the U.S. and its allies to survive, let alone win, a war fought with such powerful, unconventional weapons against our enemies remains very much in doubt. In a recent article in the National Interest entitled, “A Strategy for Avoiding a Two Front War”, former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs A. Wess Mitchell expanded upon this increasing danger warning that:

*The greatest risk facing the twenty-first-century United States, short of an outright nuclear attack, is a two-front war involving its strongest military rivals, China and Russia. Such a conflict would entail a scale of national effort and risk unseen in generations, effectively pitting America against the resources of nearly half of the Eurasian landmass. It would stretch and likely exceed the current capabilities of the U.S. military, requiring great sacrifices of the American people with far-reaching consequences for U.S. influence, alliances, and prosperity. Should it escalate into a nuclear confrontation, it could possibly even imperil the country's very existence. **Given these high stakes, avoiding a two-front war with China and Russia must rank among the foremost objectives of contemporary U.S. grand strategy.** Yet the United States has been slow to comprehend this danger, let alone the implications it holds for U.S. policy...A debate has erupted among defense intellectuals about how to handle a second-front contingency...There has been much less discussion of how, if at all, U.S. diplomacy should evolve to avert two-front war. In the current budgetary environment, though, the most likely outcome could well be the worst of all worlds—namely, that America will continue to try to overawe all threats...while reducing real defense spending. Such an approach keeps U.S. power thinly spread...This creates an ideal setting for an increasingly aligned Russia and China to conduct repeated stress tests of U.S. resolve in*

²⁷ Jamie Seidel, “China threatens to nuke Japan if country intervenes in Taiwan conflict” www.news.com.au (19 July 2021)

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ “U.S. Armed Services Hearings on U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command.” www.senate.gov (20 April 2021)

³⁰ Ibid.

*their respective neighborhoods and, when conditions are ripe, make synchronous grabs for, say, Taiwan and a Baltic state.*³¹

Rather than pursue policies designed to weaken the Sino-Russian military alliance and increase fissures between Russia and China while focusing on the defense of our vital interests, U.S. national security policy continues to focus on the defense of virtually every country in Eastern Europe as well as a number of countries in East Asia from Russia and China including countries with which the U.S. has no security commitments. Meanwhile, the U.S. has engaged in several unnecessarily provocative actions with regards to Russia and China over the past few years which has caused them to ally more closely together against us, greatly increasing the risks that the U.S. will face a simultaneous two-front war with Russia in Europe and with China in the South China Sea. The U.S. has sent warships to contest Russian dominance of the Baltic and Black Seas and sent a U.S. carrier battlegroup to the South China Sea for naval exercises immediately following a major Chinese naval exercise near Taiwan.³² U.S. leaders have also sent troops into the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania while permanently stationing troops in Poland.³³ They have also inserted U.S. ground forces into Syria, a Russian-proxy state, on the same road as Russian military units leading Russian military vehicles to collide with US military vehicles as they passed by each other.³⁴

Most disturbingly, the U.S. has even sent military trainers and lethal military aid to Ukraine to help it wage its ongoing low-intensity war with Russia, risking the outbreak of a major war between the U.S. and Russia.³⁵ If the U.S. continues its high-risk policy of military brinkmanship with Russia and China, attempting to challenge and contain them along their borders and coastal seas without engaging in some limited accommodations of their vital interests either by diplomacy or unilateral actions, the outcome, however unthinkable, might be a Sino-Russian-initiated cyber/ EMP/nuclear Armageddon that results in the end of our nation.

A New National Security Strategy for America

The time has come for U.S. leaders to discard their idealistic misconception that we live in a unipolar world that is safe and secure in which the US is universally recognized as the most powerful global superpower when the reality is entirely different. As a result of its increasing strategic military inferiority, America faces increasingly stark, limited and uncomfortable choices. America is in desperate need of a new, forward-thinking grand strategy which provides us with a path forward as to how we might be successful in countering, dividing, and disrupting this alliance of two nuclear superpowers against us while at the same time minimizing the risks of a full-scale and, likely, simultaneous conflict with Russia, China and North Korea.

The answer to the unprecedented national security dilemma America faces today and ensure its national survival is two-fold. First, U.S. leaders must abandon its outdated and failed strategy of hegemony and replace it with a grand strategy of strategic retrenchment, focused on offshore balancing. This new grand strategy must be based upon an honest, clear-eyed assessment of the relative military- strategic balance of

³¹ A. Wess Mitchell, "A Strategy for Avoiding Two Front War" www.nationalinterest.org (22 Aug 2021)

³² Brad Lendon, "US and China deploy aircraft carriers in South China Sea as tensions simmer" www.cnn.com (12 April 2020)

³³ "U.S. to Have Permanent Troop Presence in Poland as Defense Pact Agreed" (31 July 2020) www.reuters.com

³⁴ Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Troops Injured in Syria After Collision With Russian Vehicles" www.nytimes.com (26 August 2020)

³⁵ Paul McLeary, "US Trainers to Deploy to Ukraine" www.defensenews.com (21 Jan 2015)

power as it exists today rather than how we might wish it to be or how it existed three decades ago at the end of the Cold War at a time when the People's Republic of China posed a much lesser threat. A strategy of strategic retrenchment would serve to conserve America's precious blood and treasure along with its limited military resources and refocus them on the defense of its core vital interests. It would reduce the risks of the outbreak of an unnecessary war with America's nuclear superpower adversaries leading to a safer, more secure and, hopefully, more peaceful world.

This strategy has been championed by some of America's foremost political scientists such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt.³⁶ It would still try to ensure that no one major power dominates Europe and Northeast Asia. However, it would force U.S. allies to assume the main burden, and rely on local powers to balance regional hegemony such as Russia and China, while stationing US military forces over the horizon, either offshore or within the United States. An offshore balancing strategy would avoid counterinsurgency operations altogether. It recognizes that forward deployed U.S. military forces essentially serve as 'tripwires' that ensure U.S. entanglement in war in the event of aggression by one of our great power adversaries against the countries they are stationed in, but are insufficient to defend those countries or likely even to deter such aggression. A strategy of offshore balancing would restore U.S. freedom of action to choose which wars to be involved in and which ones to avoid, given that such wars could quickly and unexpectedly escalate to the nuclear level.

Accordingly, in order to reduce the increasing risk of the U.S. being entangled in great power wars, which would further expose the U.S. homeland to nuclear/EMP attack, the U.S. would withdraw its military forces from Europe, Africa and Asia, including the Middle East. It would also abstain from invading and occupying other countries or engaging in nation-building endeavors while striving to ensure it does not get bogged down in foreign wars. The U.S. would send expeditionary forces only if the nations within its sphere of influence that constitute its vital interests such as Western Europe and Japan were under imminent threat of enemy attack. An exception might be made for keeping a limited number of U.S. troops forward deployed in Germany as a hedge to help deter potential Russian aggression against its Western Europe allies in recognition of the unique importance of this region to the U.S. given its advanced economic and industrial potential

The scaled-back U.S. military presence overseas would further undercut support for anti-American terrorism and, most importantly, would greatly reduce the impetus for Russia and China to ally with each other to balance against the U.S. As part of this strategy, America would finally abandon its failed Global War on Terror which caused us to waste trillions of dollars fighting no-win counterinsurgency wars in the Middle East and refrain from modernizing and rebuilding our strategic nuclear arsenal and strategic defensive capabilities over the past two decades. This conventional military and strategic nuclear procurement 'holiday' has enabled our Sino-Russian alliance enemies to overtake us in virtually every key area of strategic military effectiveness and fighting power including critical areas of military technology.

An analysis of history demonstrates that most great powers in acute decline adopted retrenchment strategies and were markedly more successful than states that implemented other policies. Paul MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent assert that there is much historical support for pursuing such a strategy.

The historical record suggests that not only is great power retrenchment common; it is also effective. Retrenching states shift burdens to allies, constrain military budgets, and avoid militarized disputes to preserve their position in the hierarchy of nations. In contrast, states that fail to retrench never recover their rank among the great powers. Sizable forward deployments in Asia are just as likely to trap the United States in unnecessary clashes as they are to deter potential aggression. Retrenchment policies—greater burden sharing with allies, less military spending, and less involvement in

³⁶ John Mearsheimer, "Imperial By Design," www.nationalinterest.org, January-February 2011

militarized disputes—hold the most promise for arresting and reversing decline. In the competitive game of power politics, states must unsentimentally realign means with ends or be punished for their profligacy. Attempts to maintain policies advanced when U.S. relative power was greater are outdated, unfounded, and imprudent.³⁷

The adoption of a grand strategy of offshore balancing could be accompanied by the pursuit of a U.S. diplomatic ‘peace offensive’ and the negotiation of a global sphere of influence agreement, which safeguards vital U.S. interests, to avert the increasing likelihood of stumbling into an unnecessary and cataclysmic war with Russia and China.³⁸ The last sphere of influence agreement negotiated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin was at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. It was successful in keeping the great power peace in Europe for over half a century thanks, in large part, to the U.S. retention of ‘rough’ nuclear parity with the Soviet Union during the entirety of the Cold War. A global sphere of influence between the U.S., Russia and China might have similar success for the entire world. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly expressed as one of his chief foreign policy objectives the conclusion of a “new Yalta” agreement that would divide the world into regions each with its own dominant regional hegemon and include international recognition of a Russian sphere of influence over the former Soviet Union in order to avert another world war, but U.S. leaders have never agreed to consider such an agreement.³⁹

Under such an agreement, the U.S. would retain the largest sphere of influence including the entire Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, which would remain protected by the U.S. ‘nuclear umbrella.’ The Russian sphere of influence would include the former Soviet republics, Serbia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya. China’s sphere of influence might consist of North Korea, Taiwan, the South China Sea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, four Marxist/Communist nations in Southeast Asia and around half a dozen African nations currently led by Marxist/Communist dictators. Were U.S. leaders to agree to that and commit that no U.S. troops would be deployed to Eastern Europe except in case of Russian aggression, then Russia, having realized its objective of achieving military security guarantees along its western frontier, might turn its focus eastward towards the rising threat of China.

As the ancient Chinese general, Sun Tzu, wisely stated in his book “The Art of War”, “Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy.” In furtherance of this axiom, the U.S. might even agree to withdraw from NATO, which would continue to function as a European-led rather than U.S.-led alliance, in exchange for a Russian withdrawal from their alliance with China and an end to all Sino-Russian military cooperation and mutual assistance. The purpose of such a comprehensive agreement would be to recognize and respect the vital interests of all three nuclear superpowers and resolve all major outstanding disputes while minimizing potential risks of military conflict in the interests of preserving the great power peace.

In his groundbreaking article, “The New Spheres of Influence-Sharing the Globe with Other Great Powers,” former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Graham Allison states:

Even a conventional war that could escalate to nuclear war risks catastrophe...If the balance of military power in a conventional war over Taiwan or the Baltics has shifted decisively in China's and Russia's favor, current U.S. commitments are not sustainable. The gap between those commitments and the United States' actual military capabilities is a classic case of overstretch...Strategy is the purposeful alignment of means and ends.

³⁷ Paul MacDonald, Joseph M, Parent, “Resurrecting Retrenchment: The Grand Strategic Consequences of U.S. Decline” www.belforcenter.org (May 2011)

³⁸ David T. Pyne, “Trump Could Win Peace Prize with this Tri-polar Deal.” www.wnd.com (15 October 2019)

³⁹ Paul Goble, “Putin Wants “New Yalta” to Divide World into Recognized Regions with Regional Hegemons”, www.ukrweekly.com (14 Feb 2020)

*Among the many ways in which a strategy fails, the two most common are mismatch—when the means an actor can organize and sustain are insufficient to achieve the stated ends—and vision blindness, when an actor is mesmerized by an ideal but unachievable end. The United States’ twenty-first-century wars in the Middle East offer vivid examples of both.... Going forward, U.S. policymakers will have to abandon unattainable aspirations for the worlds they dreamed of and accept the fact that spheres of influence will remain a central feature of geopolitics. That acceptance will inevitably be a protracted, confusing, and wrenching process. Yet it could also bring a wave of strategic creativity—an opportunity for nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the conceptual arsenal of U.S. national security.*⁴⁰

As Secretary Allison notes in his seminal essay, Russia and China already have their own spheres of influence whether U.S. leaders are willing to recognize them or not.⁴¹ It has been repeated U.S. military incursions into their spheres of influence since the end of the Cold War (most notably the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe including the three former Soviet Baltic republics) that has provoked them to ally more closely together militarily.

Disturbingly, there have been reports that Russia and China have taken steps to form a joint missile defense system.⁴² The Russian national missile defense system consists of several thousand of ABM interceptors and is potentially capable of shooting down up to eighty percent of America’s nuclear second-strike retaliatory warheads following a hypothetical Sino-Russian nuclear first strike. This would leave perhaps six dozen U.S. warheads to impact super-hardened Russian and Chinese nuclear ICBM silos which may be able to survive near misses and deep underground nuclear command centers, some of which may be impervious to nuclear attack. Dr. Mark Schneider, one of the top U.S. nuclear weapons experts explains that, even setting aside the massive Russian national missile defense system and expanding Chinese national missile defenses, the U.S. nuclear arsenal is insufficiently sized for its mission to hold enemy nuclear forces and underground nuclear command centers at risk.⁴³

*There is an increasing disconnect between our nuclear strategy (which targets military strategic targets rather than population centers) and our nuclear targeting capability... With our current forces, the U.S. cannot possibly target these new Chinese and Russian (nuclear missile) silos with any serious level of effectiveness... In addition to the new silos, China has built the “Underground Great Wall” to protect its mobile ICBMs and Bill Gertz has reported that Russia was “modernizing deep underground bunkers” These are extraordinarily difficult to destroy or even to threaten seriously... When Russian ICBM force expansion and the deep underground facilities in Russia and China are taken into account, our existing and projected nuclear forces have little capability to threaten them. Numbers count and we no longer have the numbers.*⁴⁴

According to top China expert, Gordon Chang, Russia and China are likely coordinating, not just their joint defensive planning, but their joint offensive plans as well, to push the U.S. out of their respective spheres of influence by force.⁴⁵ They might even be planning to neutralize the U.S. with one or more

⁴⁰ “Graham Allison, “The New Spheres of Influence-Sharing the Globe with Other Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2020)

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² David Reid, “Russia is Helping China to Build a Missile Defense System, Putin Says.” www.cnn.com (4 October 2019)

⁴³ Mark B. Schneider, “The Chinese Nuclear Breakout and the Biden Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review,” www.realcleardefense.com (28 August 2021)

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Gordon Chang, “China and Russia are Setting a Collision Course with the United States.” www.thedailybeast.com (4 September 2018)

unconventional means of existential attack at the onset of any conflict to eliminate the chances of any future U.S. interference in their respective spheres of influence entirely.

Another potentially more viable and politically palatable alternative to concluding a comprehensive agreement with Russia and China, would be for the Biden Administration to take unilateral actions to pull back forward-deployed U.S. military forces from Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, the South China Sea, Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Today, the U.S. has security commitments with over fifty countries and, as a result, finds itself seriously overextended militarily.⁴⁶ U.S. leaders continue to believe that the more allies we have, the safer and more secure we are. However, commitments to fight unconventional and potentially nuclear wars with Russia and China over nations that do not constitute vital U.S. interests, create far more potential risks for U.S. national security than they could possibly confer benefits. The Biden Administration should follow the shrewd recommendation of Secretary Allison to subject all U.S. alliances with other nations to a zero-sum cost-benefit analysis to determine which ones serve to enhance U.S. national security and which ones put us at greater risk of being dragged into wars with Russia and China that don't concern vital U.S. interests.⁴⁷ Then America could shed all of our security commitments that don't pass the test.

Most urgently, U.S. leaders should immediately inform Moscow and Beijing that America will not intervene militarily in any potential wars over Taiwan or the former Soviet republics (all of which are indefensible anyway), essentially renouncing future U.S. military interventions in their spheres of influence. Such actions would serve to strengthen U.S. national security and greatly reduce the chances of an attack by Russia, China and North Korea on the U.S. homeland by reducing our perceived threat to Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang while increasing the likelihood of fissures and dissension between them, potentially dividing and disrupting their alliance over time. This is because nothing has united Russia and China more than America's short-sighted attempts to project its power into Eastern Europe and East Asia along with its attempt to become the dominant world power, without which their historical adversarial relationship might have resumed long ago.

In addition to the adoption of a new, less provocative grand strategy which aligns more with America's limited military means and recognizes Russia and China's vital interests and spheres of influence, the other important national security imperative that America must pursue to ensure its survival is to adopt a policy of strategic rearmament similar to the one we pursued during the early stages of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. U.S. policymakers must return to more realist Cold War ways of thinking in the realization that a cyber/EMP/nuclear war with our nuclear superpower adversaries is not only possible, but increasingly probable. This realization should compel U.S. leaders to engage in a near-herculean, bipartisan effort to rebuild our nuclear deterrent and strategic defenses in accordance with the specific policy recommendations at the end of this essay as swiftly as possible, re-purposing funding from less important programs for that purpose, much as we did just before and shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War.

Six Important Measures Which Could Ensure America's National Survival

There are a number of important measures which the Biden Administration and the U.S. Congress should implement as soon as possible to safeguard America against these existential threats. First, President Biden should declare a presidential cyber/EMP/missile defense emergency to re-allocate \$30 billion dollars in funding to fully harden our electronic power grid and other critical infrastructure, particularly our nuclear C3 system as well as future U.S. military satellites, against cyber/EMP attack. In addition, he

⁴⁶ "Graham Allison, "The New Spheres of Influence-Sharing the Globe with Other Great Powers," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2020)

⁴⁷ "Ibid.

should use this emergency declaration to re-allocate \$150 billion more to build 5,000 SM-3 Block IIA ABM interceptors to deploy on sixty of our Aegis cruisers and destroyers whose primary role should be 'boost phase' national missile defense, not conventional military power projection. Hundreds of these missiles have already been purchased by the U.S. Navy.

The Biden Administration should also consider deploying space-based non-nuclear missile defenses which would be even more effective in deterring enemy nuclear attack and shooting down rogue, accidental or deliberate nuclear missile attacks. Furthermore, as part of this emergency declaration, President Biden should invoke the Defense Production Act to order U.S. companies to increase U.S. tritium gas production to ensure we can produce enough of it to make sure our aging strategic nuclear warheads will work in a crisis. Full-funding for these measures could be readily obtained by ending America's two-decade long Global War on Terror, closing the vast majority of America's nearly 800 overseas military bases and bringing most of our nearly 200,000 forward-deployed military personnel home to their families, which has been estimated could save up to \$160-200 billion per year.⁴⁸

Second, President Biden should act swiftly to increase the Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) of America's Ohio-class nuclear missile submarines from one-third to two-thirds, increasing the number of nuclear missile submarines at sea at any given time from four to eight. This critically important and relatively inexpensive measure would effectively increase the number of 'ready to fire' land and sea based nuclear warheads to 1,040 while doubling the number of survivable, second-strike retaliatory strategic warheads. That would serve to ensure that America's nuclear adversaries would not be able to destroy the bulk of our nuclear missile submarine fleet in port in the event of a nuclear first strike. This is one of the most critical near-term steps U.S. leaders can take to rapidly restore the credibility of America's nuclear deterrent to discourage potential nuclear aggression by our nuclear-armed adversaries. Important related steps would be to return our fifty-eight B-52H and twenty B-2 nuclear bombers to twenty-four hour "strip alert" to help ensure a significant number of them survive a potential nuclear first strike as well as restoring the nuclear capabilities of our sixty B-1B bombers, which are the only supersonic strategic bombers the U.S. currently has in service.

Third, President Biden should use the upcoming 2022 Nuclear Posture Review to set the objective that the U.S. will seek to re-establish 'rough' nuclear parity with Russia to help ensure its nuclear arsenal remains sufficiently large to deter a Sino-Russian nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. The U.S. should tailor the size of its nuclear arsenal based on the increasing nuclear threat posed by America's peer competitors-- Russia and China. Specifically, the Biden Administration should reject the dangerous calls of those who contend that the U.S. should unilaterally disarm itself of all but 1,000 of its strategic nuclear warheads, which is less than one-third of Russia's and China's current estimated strategic nuclear arsenals and perhaps one-eighth the size of their projected nuclear arsenals once their present nuclear buildups have been completed. Nuclear deterrence is only credible when there is "a balance of terror" and the increasing imbalance between the size of our nuclear arsenal and the nuclear arsenals of our enemies threatens to embolden our adversaries to engage in a pre-emptive nuclear/EMP/cyber first strike against the U.S. homeland with little fear of an effective U.S. nuclear retaliatory response.

Since both the Russians and the Chinese appear to be in the process of rapidly surging their nuclear arsenals to 3,000-4,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads each, and in view of China's refusal to agree to limit the size and scope of its nuclear arsenal in any way, the Administration should immediately withdraw the U.S. from the New START Treaty which limits the U.S. to only 1,550 Treaty-accountable strategic warheads. President Biden should then take urgent action to issue an executive order to begin to restore rough nuclear parity with Russia and China by returning the 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads we have in reserve, as a hedge against precisely the kind of geopolitical

⁴⁸ David Vine, Where in the World Is the U.S. Military? www.politico.com (July/August 2015)

contingency which we see unfolding today, to active service atop our Minuteman III ICBM's and Trident II SLBM's. This would serve to expand our strategic nuclear arsenal from 1,600 today to as many as 3,600 over a period of six to twenty-four months without the need to build additional warheads in the near-term.

As part of this undertaking, the Administration should also increase the number of Trident II SLBM's on each Ohio nuclear missile submarine from 20 to 24 while increasing the number of warheads on each SLBM from four to eight and increasing the number of warheads on each of our Minuteman III ICBM's from one to three. This would increase the number of operational SLBM warheads from 900 to approximately 2,200 and the number of ICBM warheads from 400 to 1,100. In addition, rather than developing hypersonic missiles with conventional warheads, the U.S. should build and deploy hypersonic missiles that are armed with nuclear warheads to deter the use of the Russian and Chinese hypersonic missiles, all of which are armed with nuclear warheads, against us. Furthermore, the U.S. should consider employing full-spectrum deterrence by developing and deploying super-EMP weapons similar to Russia's and China's to hold their nations at risk in order to more effectively discourage the use of these devastating weapons against the U.S.

Should Chinese leaders withdraw their objections, the administration could negotiate a new arms control treaty with both Russia and China that limit each signatory to no more than 3,600 warheads. Such a treaty should include much stronger verification measures than the New START Treaty encompass all of the various Russian nuclear superweapons including Russian and Chinese hypersonic missiles, as well as rail-mobile ICBM's not currently covered by New START, perhaps by limiting the aggregate megatonnage of each superpower's nuclear arsenal.

Fourth, President Biden should rescind Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-60) which, according to some reports makes it official U.S. policy to 'launch on impact' (following confirmation of the first nuclear impact on U.S. soil) and return to a policy of 'launch on warning.' This would serve to better deter potential nuclear aggressors like Russia, the People's Republic of China and North Korea who may believe they can take advantage of our 'launch on impact' posture to render a decisive 'knockout' blow against us before we could retaliate against them. Opponents of returning to a 'launch on warning' posture argue that it could lead to an accidental launch leading to a nuclear exchange. However, given the fact that all U.S. nuclear missiles are pre-targeted at empty oceans, the risks of that happening are extremely low.

Fifth, in the realization that nuclear weapons constitute only a small fraction of the U.S. defense budget but are by far the most critical program to defend and deter against catastrophic and existential attack, the U.S. should fully fund the Columbia-class nuclear submarines to replace the Ohio nuclear missile submarine fleet, which will have to start being retired due to their aging hulls in 2030. In addition, the U.S. should fully fund the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program to replace the 400 Minuteman III Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's), many of which were built half a century ago (as opposed to Russia and Chinese strategic nuclear weapons system which are much newer and more modern) beginning in 2027.

Sixth, U.S. leaders must remove and replace all 300 large Chinese-manufactured transformers in its electrical power grid to prevent China from using secret "back doors" in the transformers which could enable them to take control of our grid or even shut it down entirely. The U.S. should also store enough reserve electrical power transformers in reserve in underground storage to replace all of them should they be disabled by an EMP or cyberattack. U.S. leaders must also take immediate executive and legislative actions to reduce the ability of China and other adversaries to cut off our increasingly vulnerable manufacturing supply chains in the event of the outbreak of war and ensure that the U.S. is self-sufficient in every critical area needed to defend America as well as fight and win protracted military conflicts. This would include ensuring the U.S. is capable of producing all of its own weapon systems including computers, microchips and other electronic components. As part of this effort, the Biden Administration

and the U.S. Congress should continue to support efforts to restore America's capability to mine rare-earth minerals critical to the production of modern weapons, as quickly as possible. Finally, U.S. leaders should pursue trade and taxation policies designed to 're-shore' strategic industries which have left the U.S. and relocated to China during the past two decades that produce high-tech dual-use military technology in order to prevent them nationalized by China in the event of a crisis. Such a policy would also serve to greatly expand America's tax base to better fund critical defense priorities.

In conclusion, the time has come to put aside America's partisan political differences and unite our country, as we did during the Second World War, to quickly implement these critical pro-active diplomatic and national security measures which are so desperately needed to safeguard the United States against the unprecedented dangers which threaten our continued existence as a nation. If President Biden and congressional leaders are willing to provide the courageous leadership needed to do so, while helping to educate other U.S. policymakers and our citizens about the threats we face and what we need to do to overcome them, we can and we will.

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